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Closing the Wage Gap: Cities’ and States’ Prohibitions Against Prior Salary History
Inquiries and the Implications Moving Forward
Timothy J. Nichols*
I.

Introduction

In an effort to eliminate wage discrimination on account of sex, Congress enacted the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).1 The EPA amended section 6 of the Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), adding a new subsection.2 While this new subsection prohibits employers from paying
workers of one sex different wages than workers of the other sex different wages for equal work,
the subsection also includes four enumerated exceptions.3 Despite efforts to eliminate wage
discrimination based on gender, women earned eighty-three percent of what men earned in 2015
(granted, an increase from sixty-four percent in 1980).4 While this pay gap is based on many
factors, such as (1) women being more likely to take breaks from careers to care for a family, and
(2) women being overrepresented in lower-paying occupations, surveys reveal this gap may also
be a result of gender discrimination.5
The broadest and most controversial of the exceptions contained in the FLSA is a catch-all
that permits disparities in pay between the genders “based on any other factor other than sex.” 6
Prior salary history, the focus of this Comment, is a regularly relied-upon factor employers assert
as a “factor other than sex” when facing claims of gender-based wage discrimination under the
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Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
2
Id. The Act created 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963) that prohibits gender discrimination in wage payment practices. Id. at
56–57.
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Anna Brown and Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/03/gender-pay-gap-facts/.
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of women and 63% of men believe more changes must be implemented to achieve gender equality in the workplace.
Id.
6
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
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EPA and FLSA, as seen in the cases discussed below.7 Further adding to the controversy is the
fact that the different circuit courts that have addressed the relationship between prior salary history
and the “factor other than sex” exception have applied different standards in evaluating the claims.8
Two circuit courts have held that prior salary history cannot be the sole factor in justifying pay
disparities between the genders.9 Two other circuit courts allow reliance on prior salary history as
the sole justification, but conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness and asserted reasons for the
reliance.10 One final circuit court accepts prior salary history as a “factor other than sex”
unequivocally.11
In an effort to continue closing the gender wage gap, multiple cities and states around the
country have enacted legislation that prohibits employers from inquiring about applicants’ prior
salary histories or requiring applicants to disclose such information. 12 All of these laws have a
general prohibition on employers seeking an applicant’s prior salary history but have certain
unique provisions and range from more restrictive to less restrictive depending on the particular
law.13 And although the push to institute these types of laws has intensified, these laws have been
met with resistance.14
This Comment argues that state and town legislatures, displeased with the on-going wage
discrepancy between the genders and the analysis and outcomes of the judiciary in cases alleging
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gender discrimination under the EPA, are enacting these new laws to remove the most
controversial element of courts’ analysis. Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth discussion
of the EPA and the FLSA, along with the conflicting stances federal circuit courts have adopted
regarding the interplay between prior salary history and one of the exceptions of the FLSA. Part
III discusses the laws currently enacted by cities and states all across the United States as of this
writing and compares and contrasts elements of the laws with each other. Part IV introduces some
of the emerging backlash against the laws and the implications the laws have across the country
now and moving forward. Part V argues that the cities and states enacting the laws are effectively
circumventing one of the exceptions under the FLSA by removing prior salary in its entirety from
the consideration, eliminating the catch-all from the courts’ analysis. Part VI suggests that, until
prior salary history inquiry bans become universally enacted, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’
approach is the correct approach to analyzing prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.” Part
VII briefly concludes.
II. The Equal Pay Act, “Factors Other Than Sex,” and the Current Circuit Split
A. The Equal Pay Act
As mentioned above, the EPA “prohibit[s] discrimination on account of sex in the payment
of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”15 The
new subsection to FLSA added by the EPA states:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such an establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.16

15
16

Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56.
Id. at 56–57; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
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The above text comes with a caveat, however, that a wage disparity ordinarily impermissible under
the statute is otherwise permissible: “where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”17 The “factor other
than sex” exception is the broadest-worded exception among the enumerated exceptions and the
statute does not state a scope or any standard for determining which factors qualify as a “factor
other than sex.”18 Some have argued prior salary history should be considered a “suspect factor”—
a factor that, if courts allow employers to rely on it to permanently justify salary disparities, could
perpetuate gender-based violations of the EPA.19
Courts have also indicated caution when dealing with prior salary history as a “factor other
than sex.”20 The Ninth Circuit noted that prior salary history could be manipulated to provide a
pretext for intentional gender discrimination, and an employer could take advantage of “unfairly
low salaries historically paid to women” in order to perpetuate that discrimination.21 The Seventh
Circuit recognized the concern that previous employers might have engaged in sex-based
discrimination in wage practices, thereby resulting in lower wages for female employees when
current employers rely on that tainted prior salary history. 22 Despite this caution, courts accept
that prior salary history may justify current pay disparities, but the courts are split on whether prior
salary history satisfies the “factor other than sex” exception under the EPA.23
B. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History and an Additional Factor

17

Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (emphasis added).
Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note: When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard for the Identification of “Factors
Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1989).
19
Id. at 1102.
20
See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Covington v. Southern Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th
Cir. 1982).
21
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
22
Covington, 816 F.2d at 323.
23
See infra Part II(B)–(D); see also Hamburg, supra note 18, at 1085.
18
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Some of the circuit courts adopted the viewpoint that prior salary history must be paired
with an additional factor in order to qualify as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA. In Irby v.
Bittick,24 a female criminal investigator for a county sheriff’s department sued under the EPA when
the department paid two new male additions to the team substantially more than she was paid.25
The defendants argued that the reliance on the prior salaries of the male employees in setting their
current salaries qualified as a legitimate factor other than sex.26 The district court, however,
rejected the argument, holding that “[p]rior salary alone is not a legitimate ‘factor other than
sex.’”27 The court explained that if prior salary history alone was the sole justification, the
exception would swallow the rule, perpetuating gender pay inequality.28 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized it consistently adhered to the view that under the EPA a pay disparity between
the genders cannot be justified by prior salary history alone, and the court rejected reliance on prior
salary history as a sole justification for the pay disparity.29
While the court rejected a reliance on prior salary history by itself, it nonetheless held that
a defendant can rely on prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” when the defendant also
relied on something else, such as experience.30 The court found “there is no prohibition on utilizing
prior pay as part of a mixed-motive.”31 Since the defendants relied both on prior salary history
and the experience of the two new male employees, the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied that the
defendants properly relied on a “factor other than sex” under the EPA to justify a pay disparity.32

24

44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 952–53.
26
Id. at 955.
27
Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993)
28
Id.
29
Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (citing Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988)).
30
Irby, 44 F.3d at 955.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 957.
25
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In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc.,33 a fired male employee sued for, among other things,
gender discrimination based on Williams Sonoma paying him less than a female employee in the
same position.34 The plaintiff suggested that Williams Sonoma adhered to the “market factor”
theory, whereby an employer justifies wage disparities based on the pay rates the two genders
command in the marketplace.35 After rejecting this contention for lacking relevance, the court
noted that the focus of the plaintiff’s argument was that Williams Sonoma matched the female
employee’s prior salary.36 The Tenth Circuit then stated that considering a new employee’s prior
salary history is not prohibited under section 206(d)(iv) of the EPA.37 Instead, it is the employer’s
sole reliance on prior salary to justify a pay disparity that is precluded by the EPA; and when an
employer bases a new employee’s salary on prior salary history and something else like
qualifications and experience, the employer has successfully invoked the “factor other than sex”
defense.38 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, by requiring an additional factor other than prior salary
history for a “factor other than sex” defense, impose the strictest, most scrutinizing view of this
exception under the EPA.
C. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History, Case-by-Case, and Reasonableness
Other circuit courts accept the use of prior salary history as the sole factor in a “factor other
than sex” defense, unlike the above-mentioned cases,39 but still conduct a factual analysis on a
case-by-case basis or inquire into the reasonableness of the reliance on prior salary history. In
Taylor v. White,40 when a female United States Army employee sued her employer because her

33

70 Fed. Appx. 500 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 504.
35
Id. at 507.
36
Id. at 508.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See supra Part II(B).
40
321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003).
34
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male colleagues performing the same work received higher pay,41 she contended that an employer
should be prohibited from relying on prior salary history or a salary retention policy to avoid
liability under the EPA because relying on said factors allows the perpetuation of wage
inequalities.42 The Eight Circuit, however, stated that nothing on the face of the EPA indicates
any limitations to the catch-all “factor other than sex” defense, and the legislative history bolsters
the view of a broad interpretation of this catch-all exception.43 While the court acknowledged that
even a salary retention policy could be used to perpetuate unequal wages based on past
discrimination, these concerns do not dictate adopting a per se rule finding all salary retention
practices inherently discriminatory.44
Rather than adopt a per se rule, the court instead recognized “the need to carefully examine
the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims
of unequal pay.”45 The Eighth Circuit thought a case-by-case analysis into the reliance on prior
salary history or salary retention policies with a discerning eye on the alleged gender-based
practices would protect certain freedoms in business as Congress intended with the “factor other
than sex” defense.46

What the Eighth Circuit did not endorse, however, is conducting a

reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s actions or limiting the application of a salary retention
policy to exigent circumstances only, as it would unnecessarily narrow the intent of the “factor
other than sex” defense.47

41

Id. at 714.
Id. at 717.
43
Id. at 717–18. “[T]he catch-all provision is necessary due to the impossibility of predicting and listing each and
every exception.” Id. at 718.
44
Id. at 718.
45
Id.
46
Taylor, 321 F.3d at 720.
47
Id.
42
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The Ninth Circuit took a more narrow view than the Eighth Circuit, but still broader than
the Tenth or Eleventh Circuits, in the most recent instance of a circuit court ruling on a gender
discrimination case under the EPA, where a female county public schools employee sued the
county after discovering the county paid her less than her male colleagues.48 When the County
moved for summary judgment, it acknowledged the pay disparity but based the discrepancy on a
factor other than sex—prior salary history.49 The district court rejected this defense and denied
summary judgment, concluding that reliance exclusively on prior salary history is not a satisfactory
“factor other than sex” defense.50
Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit held that there is no strict prohibition against using
prior salary history under the EPA, but it does not automatically qualify as a “factor other than
sex” for purposes of the affirmative defense.51

Rather, prior salary history alone could

satisfactorily justify a pay disparity only when “the factor ‘effectuate[s] some business policy’ and
that the employer ‘use[s] the factor reasonably in light of the employer’s stated purpose as well as
its other practices.’”52 When the plaintiff argued that relying on prior salary history alone would
perpetuate existing pay disparities and therefore undermine the intended goal EPA, the court
indicated that, in deciding the very same issue in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., requiring the
employer to show that using prior salary history effectuated some business policy and the factor
was used reasonably would alleviate these concerns.53 While both the Ninth and the Eighth
Circuits state that prior salary history alone satisfies the “factor other than sex” factor under the
EPA, the Eighth Circuit’s case-by-case factual analysis and the Ninth Circuit’s “effectuated

Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, reh’g granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.) (en banc).
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1165.
52
Id. (quoting Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1982)).
53
Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1166 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876–78).
48
49
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business policy” nonetheless indicate these circuits will view reliance on prior salary history alone
with some suspicion.
D. The Circuit Split: Deference to the Defense
One circuit court, in the broadest interpretation of the “factor other than sex” defense under
the EPA, accepts prior salary history as a factor other than sex without any qualifications or
limitations.54 A female employee for the Department of Human Services in Illinois sued under the
EPA, putting forward two arguments: (1) prior salary history must include an acceptable business
reason; and (2) the use of prior salary history discriminates because all pay systems inherently
discriminate based on sex.55 The Seventh Circuit noted how four appellate courts accept prior
salary history as a “factor other than sex,” but only if the employer had an acceptable business
reason.56 In looking to the actual statute, however, the court found that nothing in section 206(d)
allows a court to set standards on what qualifies as an acceptable business practice, and that “the
statute asks whether the employer has a reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’
reason.”57 As long as employers avoid forbidden reliance on criteria like race or sex, employers
may set their own standards for determining pay.58 The Seventh Circuit’s rule for prior salary
history as a “factor other than sex” is reduced down to a single sentence: “[T]he employer may act
for any reason, good or bad, that is not one of the prohibited criteria such as race, sex, age, or
religion.”59
There is one caveat, however, to the Seventh Circuit’s rule. The court acknowledged that
in certain lines of employment wage patterns could be discriminatory, but the court also noted how

See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 468.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 468–69.
59
Id. at 469.
54
55
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this must be proved and not assumed.60 Where an employee has been discriminated against in a
prior job in violation of the EPA, relying on those wages to determine a new salary would
perpetuate said discrimination in violation of the EPA.61 Absent evidence that plaintiff’s prior job
engaged in wage discrimination in violation of the EPA, defendants’ reliance on that prior wage
history was proper, and the court held the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.62 The
Seventh Circuit, unlike all of the cases mentioned above, grants the most deference to an
employer’s use of prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.”
III. The Laws from Varying Cities and States
Given the varying approaches taken by the Federal Circuits regarding prior salary history
as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA in conjunction with the fact that all circuits accept prior
salary history as a factor to some degree,63 cities and states across the country have simplified the
analysis: by removing prior salary history as a factor altogether.
A. The Massachusetts Law
The Massachusetts law is intended to close the wage gap between the genders, with a focus
on the phenomenon that lower wages and salaries of women follow them throughout their
careers.64 The Governor signed the bill into law by on August 1, 2016, and it is expected to take
effect July 2018.65 It also bears mentioning that this new Massachusetts law includes a codification
of section 206(d) of the FLSA as amended by the EPA, but noticeably absent in the enumerated
exceptions is the broad “factor other than sex” language of the EPA.66

60

Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470.
Id.
62
Id.
63
See supra Part II.
64
Stacy Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/business/dealbook/wage-gap-massachusetts-law-salary-history.html.
65
Id.
66
Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2016) with Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 and 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1).
61
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As an initial matter, the law prohibits an employer from seeking an applicant’s prior salary
history from the applicant’s current or former employer.67 Once the employer has extended an
employment offer, including compensation, to the applicant, however, said applicant can give
written authorization to the employer to confirm prior salary history with prior employers. 68 the
Massachusetts law makes it unlawful for an employer to prohibit an employee from discussing
either the employee’s own, or another employee’s, wages as a condition of employment. 69 The
employer also may not screen applicants by setting a minimum or maximum criteria that the
applicant’s prior salary or compensation history must satisfy; nor may the employer condition
being granted an interview or continued consideration for an offer of employment on the
applicant’s disclosure of prior salary history.70 Lastly, the law forbids an employer from firing or
otherwise retaliating against an employee because the employee: (1) resisted any action by the
employer prohibited under this new law; (2) already did or is about to complain or institute a
proceeding against the employee for violating any of the above-mentioned prohibitions; (3)
testified or is about to testify or otherwise assist an investigation into violations of the law; or (4)
revealed the employee’s own salary information or asked about another employee’s salary. 71
The Massachusetts law does grant a degree of reprieve with a safe harbor provision,
however, for any employer charged with gender-based wage discrimination.72

It appears,

however, that this safe harbor does not apply where the employer violates the prohibitions on
seeking prior salary history.73 Provided the employer demonstrates that within the last three years
the employer had performed a pay practice self-evaluation and has made reasonable progress

67

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(3) (2016).
Id.
69
Id. § 105A(c)(1).
70
Id. § 105A(c)(2).
71
Id. § 105A(c)(4).
72
Id. § 105A(d).
73
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2016).
68
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towards eliminating gender-based pay differentials, the employer has an affirmative defense.74
The employer can design this self-evaluation, but the evaluation must be reasonable in detail and
scope relative to the employer’s size or consistent with attorney general’s standard templates or
forms.75 It is important to note that this safe harbor provision does not apply to an alleged violation
of Massachusetts’s general gender-based wage discrimination law if the alleged violation occurred
prior to the completion of the self-evaluation or six months thereafter.76

Simplified,

Massachusetts’s law prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an applicant’s
disclosure of prior salary history, seeking such salary history information without the consent of
the applicant or prior to offering an employment opportunity with compensation, or retaliating
against any employee or applicant that opposes such illegal practices.77
B. The Philadelphia Law
Philadelphia enacted its own prohibition against employers requiring applicants to disclose
prior salary history, signed into law by the mayor on January 23, 2017, intended to be effective
120 says later on May 23, 2017.78 In its findings, the Philadelphia City Council stated: (1) that the
gender wage gap still exists in the United States; (2) that this gap has narrowed only by less than
half a penny per year since 1963 when the EPA was passed; (3) basing a worker’s current wages
or salary on prior salary history only perpetuates the gender wage disparity; and (4) salary offers
should not be based on prior salary history.79
In order to combat the above-mentioned issues, the Philadelphia law makes it unlawful for
an employer to: (1) inquire into an applicant’s salary history; (2) require the applicant to disclose

74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. § 105A(c)(1)–(4).
78
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017).
79
Id. § 9-1131(1).
75
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prior salary history; (3) condition employment or consideration for an interview or employment
on the applicant disclosing such information; or (4) retaliate against an applicant for refusing to
comply with or opposing such salary history inquiries.80 These prohibitions mirror those of the
Massachusetts law described above.81 Unlike Massachusetts, however, Philadelphia imposes an
additional restriction that states an employer cannot rely on salary history at any stage in the
employment process, such as in negotiating or drafting a contract.82 The employer may rely on
such information provided that the applicant “knowingly and willing disclosed his or her wage
history to the employer.”83 None of these provisions apply to employers following state, federal
or local law specifically permitting disclosure or verification of wage history for employment
purposes, however.84 Absent from the Philadelphia law is a safe harbor provision as found in the
Massachusetts law,85 and the Philadelphia statute does not include a provision permitting an
employer to seek the applicant’s prior salary history after an offer of employment has been
negotiated and extended to the applicant like in Massachusetts and Delaware.86
The Philadelphia law imposes the same general prohibitions on an employer requiring an
applicant to disclose prior salary history or conditioning consideration for employment on such
disclosure, seeking such information from current or prior employers, and prohibiting retaliation
against applicants who resist.87 Philadelphia goes further though, prohibiting an employer from
relying on prior salary history unless the applicant reveals such information knowingly and
willingly.88

80

Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(i).
See supra Part III(A).
82
PHILAELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii) (2017).
83
Id.
84
Id. § 9-1131(2)(b).
85
Compare PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017) with G. L. c. 149, § 105A(d).
86
Compare PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1131 (2017) with supra Part III(A) and infra Part III(D).
87
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(i)–(ii) (2017).
88
Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii).
81
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C. The New York City Law
New York City enacted its prohibition against salary history inquiries when the mayor
signed it on May 4, 2017, with the effective date being October 31, 2017.89 The law makes it
unlawful for an employer to “inquire about the salary history of an applicant for employment.” 90
“Inquire” means any type of question or statement to the applicant, the applicant’s current or prior
employer, or a current or former agent or employee of such employer in any method for the
applicant’s salary history.91 The inquiry definition also extends to searching publicly available
records for such information.92
Similar to Philadelphia, New York City also prohibits an employer from relying on prior
salary history for determining salary, benefits or other compensation to offer to an applicant at any
stage of the hiring process.93 If an applicant, without prompting, voluntarily discloses prior salary
history to an employer, its employee or agent, or an employment agent, the prospective employer
is free to rely on such information.94 Furthermore, an employer may discuss with an applicant the
applicant’s expectations as to salary, benefits, and other compensation, provided there is no inquiry
into prior salary history.95
Additionally, like Philadelphia, the law does not apply where federal, state, or local law
requires disclosure of such salary history.96 The New York City law, however, also exempts
internal transfers and promotions and public employee positions where salary is guided by

Brie Kluytenaar, Update on New York City Legislation Limiting Salary History Inquiries, THE NAT’L L. REV. (May
10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-new-york-city-legislation-limiting-salary-history-inquiries.
90
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(b)(1) (2017).
91
Id. § 8-107(25)(a).
92
Id.
93
Id. § 8-107(25)(b)(2).
94
Id. § 8-107(25)(d).
95
Id. § 8-107(25)(c).
96
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(e)(1) (2017).
89
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collective bargaining procedures.97 Lastly, where an employer seeks to verify non-salary related
information or conduct a background check and discovers salary-related information, the employer
has not violated the law, but still may not rely on such information in determining an applicant’s
offered salary.98
New York City’s prohibition against salary history inquiries generally mirrors that of
Philadelphia on what employer actions are prohibited, but also seems to provide more protections
for employers, mainly in allowing discussions about “salary expectations”99 and shielding the
employer for accidental salary history discoveries.100
D. The Delaware Law
When signing the salary history ban into law, Delaware Governor John Carney was quoted
as saying: “‘All Delawareans should expect to be compensated equally for performing the same
work. This new law will help guarantee that across out state, and address a persistent wage gap
between men and women.’”101

The law went into effect December 14, 2017.102

Like

Massachusetts,103 Delaware prohibits an employer or an employer’s agent from screening
applicants based on prior salary history, including requiring prior salary to satisfy either a
minimum or maximum criteria.104 The employer also may not “[s]eek the compensation history
of an applicant from the applicant or a current or former employer.”105 Similar to New York

Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(2), (4). “Collective bargaining” is defined as “[n]egotiations between an employer and the
representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline,
and fringe benefits.” Collective Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).
98
Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(3).
99
Id. § 8-107 (25)(c).
100
Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(3).
101
Alex Vuocolo, Delaware First State to Enact Salary History Ban, DEL. BUS. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2017)
http://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/delaware-first-state-enact-salary-history-ban/.
102
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(b) (2017).
103
See supra Part III(A).
104
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(B)(b)(1).
105
Id. § 709(B)(b)(2).
97
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City,106 however, an employer may still discuss and negotiate expected compensation with the
applicant, provided that there is no request or requirement for the applicant’s compensation
history.107 Furthermore, similar to Massachusetts,108 an employer can seek an applicant’s salary
history after an employment offer that includes compensation has been extended to the applicant,
but differing from Massachusetts, this offer must also be accepted.109 This inquiry is solely for
confirming the applicant’s prior salary history.110
It is important to note that the Delaware law is certainly the barest, least descriptive of the
laws enacting prohibitions on salary history inquiries described in this note.111 This could cause
problems for employers, uncertain of what exactly is prohibited and what is allowed. Regardless,
the Delaware law does what every other law described in this Comment does: prohibits employers
from inquiring into the salary history of an applicant while granting an employer flexibility to
make a competitive offer to that applicant.112
E. The Oregon Law
Oregon’s ban on seeking prior salary history goes into effect October 2017; however, the
law does not permit civil actions against employers who violate this law until January 2024.113
Oregon, in its laws prohibiting salary history inquiries, also includes a codification of section
206(d)(1) of the FLSA.114 Oregon’s codification includes a number of exceptions justifying pay
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disparities between employees of different genders, but as seen in Massachusetts, the catch-all
“factor other than sex” language has been removed.115 The absence of this catch-all language is
telling—had Massachusetts or Oregon desired the “factor other than sex” language, it would have
been included.
Turning to the salary history-specific enactments, Oregon has made it unlawful for an
employer to “[s]creen job applicants based on current or past compensation.”116 While not
explicitly stated, this condition certainly includes the minimum-maximum criteria element as
already seen in Massachusetts and Delaware.117 The law also forbids an employer from using
current or past compensation as a factor in determining the compensation offered to a prospective
employee.118 This prohibition, however, does not apply to an employer when a current employee
is considered for a transfer, move, or hire to a new position with that same employer.119
Furthermore, under chapter 659A of the Oregon Revised Statute, an employer cannot seek an
applicant’s prior salary history from the applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.120
Once the employer has extended an employment offer that includes the amount of compensation,
an employer can request written authorization from the applicant to confirm his or her prior salary
history.121 This provision is in line with what Massachusetts and Delaware require.122
Oregon, like Massachusetts, also offers a safe harbor provision in its law alleviates an
employer from liability under certain conditions; except unlike Massachusetts, this safe harbor
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does appear to apply to violations of the prohibition against salary history inquiry.123 It does
appear, however, that this safe harbor does not apply to direct violations of the salary history
inquiry ban.124 The employer will be liable neither for compensatory nor punitive damages if,
within three years, the employer conducted a good-faith equal-pay analysis reasonable in detail
and scope according to the size of the employer and related to the protected class in the suit;125 the
wage disparity must also have been eliminated for the specific plaintiff and the employer must
have taken reasonable and substantial steps to eliminate the wage disparity for the protected class
overall.126
Oregon is ultimately seeking to prohibit employers from screening applicants based on
prior salary and using prior salary in determining how much to offer an applicant,127 as well as
seeking this information from the applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer. 128 But
the employer also has a degree of leeway; an employer is allowed to confirm prior salary after
extending a job offer which includes compensation129 and the employer is protected by a safe
harbor provision.130
F. The San Francisco Law
In almost identical language to the Philadelphia law, the San Francisco City Council found
that: (1) women in San Francisco suffer from a gender wage gap; (2) the gender wage gap has
narrowed less than half a penny per year since the 1963 enactment of the EPA; (3) seeking prior
salary history contributes to the wage gap by perpetuating wage inequalities; (4) women are put at
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a disadvantage in negotiating salary when required to disclose prior salary history; (5) prior salary
history is unlikely to not be a factor in negotiating or setting a salary offer; (6) the new law will
ensure that a woman’s prior wage will not weigh down her earnings throughout her career; and (7)
the new law will ensure employees and employers negotiate salaries based on qualifications rather
than prior salary history.131
Turning to the law itself, an employer is prohibited from inquiring into an applicant’s prior
salary history,132 with “inquire” meaning any direct or indirect form of communication in any type
of means to gather this information from the applicant.133 Further, an employer cannot consider
an applicant’s prior salary history in determining what salary to offer, regardless of whether the
applicant discloses the prior salary history voluntarily.134 This is a sharp deviation from the
exceptions included in both the Philadelphia and New York City laws.135 Also, San Francisco, as
displayed in previously discussed laws, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or in any other
way retaliating against an applicant for refusing to disclose prior salary history.136
In another unique feature of the law, San Francisco also imposes liability on current and
former employers, as a current or former employer cannot release the salary history of a current or
former employee to said employee’s current or prospective employer without written authorization
from the employee.137 Only San Francisco imposes such a restriction on current or previous
employers.138 Lastly, an applicant can voluntarily disclose his or her prior salary history after an
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employer makes an initial salary offer to negotiate a different salary. 139 Only then may an
employer use such a disclosure, but strictly as it relates to making a counter-offer.140 While San
Francisco imposes many of the provisions already enacted by other cities and states, it is certainly
the strictest, most pro-employee of the laws in light of the provision prohibiting an employer from
considering prior salary history after an applicant makes a voluntary disclosure and the provision
imposing liability on an employer revealing the information instead of just on the employer
seeking the information.
G. The California Law
A bill, intending to narrow the gender wage gap by prohibiting employers from asking
about prior salary history was introduced in California.141 Whether it would be signed into law
was unclear, however, as the Governor of California, Jerry Brown, had vetoed a bill implementing
the same laws two years earlier after being pressured by business groups.142 At the time, the
governor was quoted as saying that the law prevented employers “‘from obtaining relevant
information with little evidence that this would assure more equitable wages.’”143 The measure in
2015, however, had no G.O.P. support and received not one G.O.P. vote, whereas the more recent
bill was co-authored by two Republicans and the bill garnered ten G.O.P. votes.144 The bill did
have opposition from powerful business groups as the Chamber of Commerce has gathered
together an extensive coalition of detractors.145
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The Governor signed the bill into law on October 12, 2017.146 An employer is now
prohibited from relying on an applicant’s salary history as a factor for deciding whether to offer
the applicant a job or how much to pay.147 The employer also may not seek such salary history
information, whether it be oral or in writing, in person or through an agent, of an applicant.148 An
applicant may voluntarily disclose his or her salary history information, and once an applicant does
so, an employer is free to consider and rely on that information for determining an applicant’s
offered salary.149 These prohibitions will not apply to any salary history information that is
disclosable according to state or federal law,150 but are enforceable against “all employers,
including state and local government employers and the Legislature.151 The bill went into effect
on January 1, 2018.152
IV. The Backlash, Implications, and Outlook in the Wake of these Laws
A. The Legal Backlash
These laws have faced backlash, however, including the Philadelphia ordinance that is now
being challenged in court; the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia153 has brought suit
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to strike down the ordinance.154 Experts believe this suit “may set the tone for future litigation
over pay-history laws elsewhere.”155
In its complaint, the Chamber stated that rather than achieve gender wage equality, the law
“will chill the protected speech of employers and immeasurably complicate their task of making
informed hiring decisions.”156 The Chamber, in its main argument, asserted that the ordinance
violates employers’ First Amendment rights to free speech because it is both over- and underinclusive,157 and that the ordinance violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause.158 As to the First Amendment, the Chamber alleges that
the ordinance imposes both content-based and speaker-based restrictions on employers’ speech
because employers, and only employers, are prohibited from asking about prior salary history. 159
Also, prohibiting employers from seeking such information is a content-based restriction on
employers’ speech, which can only withstand strict scrutiny when the restriction serves a
compelling state interest.160 The Chamber alleges the law serves no compelling interest because
while Philadelphia has a compelling interest in eliminating pay disparities based on gender
discrimination, that interest does not extend to wage differences based on factors such as skill or
training, which the Chamber believes the new law covers.161 The complaint further alleges that
the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause because the ordinance is impermissibly vague by
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failing to define key terms;162 and it violates the Commerce Clause because the law extends to any
employer that either employs at least one employee in Philadelphia or transacts business in
Philadelphia, even if that employer is in another state.163 Based on these allegations, the Chamber
has requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent Philadelphia from enforcing the
ordinance.164
After receiving the Chamber’s complaint, on April 19, 2017, the judge stayed the effective
date of the ordinance pending the outcome of the Chamber’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.165 In order to avoid confusion, the city agreed to the stay for employers and employees
as the legal process moves forward.166 On May 30, 2017, however, Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg,
presiding over this litigation, found that the Chamber of Commerce failed to demonstrate with
specific facts that one or more of its members will be directly affected by Philadelphia’s ordinance
so as to establish standing.167 Without such facts, the court cannot determine whether any of the
individual members would have standing to bring suit; since the Chamber could not show that at
least one of its members would have standing to sue, the Chamber itself does not have standing to
sue, and the judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss.168 The matter was dismissed, however,
without prejudice, and the Chamber was granted leave to amend its complaint within fourteen days
of the order.169
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On June 13, 2017, the Chamber filed its amended complaint, alleging the same
constitutional violations as before; however, this time the amended complaint included an
extensive outline of the ways that the ordinance will harm certain particular enumerated members
as exemplars for the group as a whole.170 Philadelphia did not file a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, so this lawsuit will be decided on the merits.171 Being a case of first impression, the
result of this lawsuit could resonate throughout the country with other state and city legislatures
enacting, or considering enacting, other similar salary history bans.172
B. The Legislative Pushback
a. The Illinois Veto
Rather than enact legislation similar to the ones seen above,173 the Governor of Illinois
vetoed a bill that would prohibit employers from asking about an applicant’s prior salary history.174
The Governor stated his support for eliminating the gender wage gap, but suggested a bill more
closely modeled after the Massachusetts law that would provide employers with more leeway.175
The Illinois bill did not include the caveat, as found in the Massachusetts bill, that an employer
could seek prior salary history after offering a candidate the job with a salary. 176 There was
disappointment in the Governor vetoing the bill, but the indication that the Governor recognizes
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the existence of a gender wage gap and that a prohibition on asking about prior salary history could
eliminate it is encouraging to supporters of the bill.177
Instead of re-working the bill, those in favor of the bill planned to override the Governor’s
veto legislatively in the November veto session.178 The initial bill passed in the House by a vote
of 91-24 and passed in the Senate by a vote of 35-18 (with one member voting present).179 The
override requires seventy-one votes in the House and thirty-six votes in the Senate, and a
Republican representative expressed his optimistic belief that the override effort will be successful
due to the bill’s strong bi-partisan support.180 On November 9, 2017, however, when the Illinois
Senate attempted to override Governor Rauner’s veto, it failed to do so. 181 The Illinois House had
successfully overridden the veto 80-33, but the Illinois Senate vote, needing three-fifths of
members (thirty-six members) to vote in favor of the override, only garnered twenty-nine “yeas,”
seventeen “nays,” and one “present.”182 At this point, it is unclear what will happen in Illinois
regarding a prohibition against salary history inquiries, but the attempt to enact such legislation
signals the growing desire for such prohibitions.
b. The New Jersey Veto
In the Summer of 2017, the New Jersey legislature put forward an amendment to the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) that would have enacted similar salary history bans
as seen above.183 The law would have prohibited employers from: (1) inquiring about an
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applicant’s compensation and benefit history at any point during the hiring process; (2) screening
a candidate based on his or her prior salary or benefits history; (3) using that prior salary history
to make pay determinations; and (4) retaliating against an employee who shared terms and
conditions of employment, like compensation, with other current or former employees. 184 A
candidate could volunteer prior salary history, at which point the employer could verify the
information, provided that there was no employer coercion and the candidate gave written
authorization for the inquiry.185
Chris Christie, then-Governor of New Jersey, vetoed this bill on July 25, 2017 because he
felt that the law would punish inquiries made without discriminatory intent or impact in
contradiction to the NJLAD.186 Governor Christie indicated receptiveness to consideration of a
bill that could protect against wage discrimination without being hostile to business.187 There was
an expectation that once Governor Christie was out of office in early 2018, the legislature would
again introduce the same or a similar bill.188 Phil Murphy, a Democrat, defeated Republican Kim
Guadagno in the New Jersey gubernatorial election and took office January 16, 2018.189 Governor
Murphy has already pledged to sign pay equity legislation into law, nearly assuring that New Jersey
will have new pay equity laws, although the specifics of such legislation is not known.190
C. What’s on the Horizon?
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New York City Public Advocate Letitia James expects a legal challenge from business
groups like what occurred in Philadelphia.191 James expects likely litigation because of the
pushback the New York City law received from trade associations like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.192 She was quoted as saying, “‘I suspect that someone will probably file a lawsuit,’”
adding, “‘Whenever you make any change and move the needle forward, it’s inevitable that some
individuals will push back.’”193 As of writing, there is no indication that any suit has been filed
challenging the New York City law.194
D. A National Ban on Prior Salary History Inquiries
On May 11, 2017, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Democrat from the District
of Columbia, introduced a bill to amend the FLSA to prohibit certain practices by employers
regarding prior salary history, cited as the “Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.”195 This Act would
introduce a new section, section 8, to the FLSA making it unlawful for an employer to: (1) screen
prospective employees based on prior salary history in such ways as (a) requiring that prior salary
meet a minimum or maximum criteria, (b) requesting or requiring prior salary history as a
condition of being interviewed, or (c) conditioning continued consideration for an offer of
employment on the disclosure of prior salary history;196 (2) seek an applicant’s prior salary history
from any current or former employer of the applicant;197 and (3) fire or retaliate against a current
or prospective employee for: (a) opposing any of the practices made unlawful above, (b) nearing
the process of making a complaint against the employer for violations of this act, or (c) testifying
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or is about to testify, assist, or participate in an investigation relating to the prohibited conduct.198
Since being referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on the same day as
the bill was introduced, there has been no further action on the Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.199
V. Achieving the EPA’s Goals and Changing the Courts’ Analysis
In enacting these laws, either the laws themselves or the lawmakers signing them have
hinted at one of the reasons for the enactment of such measures: the EPA has failed to accomplish
what it set out to do. The Philadelphia law acknowledges the dismal lack of narrowing in the
gender wage gap since the passage of the EPA, and relying on prior salary history perpetuates
wage inequalities.200 Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York City, was quoted saying, “‘It is
unacceptable that we’re still fighting for equal pay for equal work. The simple fact is that women
and people of color are frequently paid less for the same work as their white, male counterparts.”201
He followed with, “This Administration has taken bold steps to combat the forces of inequality
that hold people back, and this bill builds upon the progress we have made to close the pay gap
and ensure everyone is treated with the respect they deserve.”202 The Mayor of Delaware echoed
a similar sentiment as Mayor Bill de Blasio when signing the Delaware law into legislation.203 As
previously mentioned, noticeably absent from Oregon’s law outlining the bona fide reasons for a
pay disparity is the vague language of “factor other than sex,” in addition to banning prior salary
history.204 This suggests an awareness that employers have been utilizing the prior salary history
and “factors other than sex” at large to perpetuate gender wage discrimination The San Francisco
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law stated the same findings as Philadelphia, hinting at a failure of the EPA and how reliance on
prior salary history perpetuates gender wage inequality, including findings related to Rizo
regarding how relying solely on salary history would be in opposition to the goals of Congress in
enacting the EPA.205 Governor Jerry Brown of California even described the “simple question”
of prior salary as being a “barrier to equal pay.”206 Explicitly or implicitly, lawmakers are
accelerating the goals of the EPA prohibitions against salary history inquiries, no longer
acquiescing to the tortoise-like pace of historical progress.
Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether an employer’s reliance on prior
salary history is genuine or a pretext for taking advantage of discriminatory wage practice, or even
if the applicant’s prior salary was based on sexual discrimination.207 And although circuit courts
acknowledge the potential for employers exploiting prior salary history as a “factor other than
sex,” the circuit courts continue to uphold its use as an affirmative defense, albeit without any
uniformity to its application.208 Another clear, albeit unspoken, goal of these state and municipal
legislatures is to eliminate prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” in its entirety so as to
remove it from a court’s consideration when hearing a sex-based wage discrimination claim.
While a “factor other than sex” defense is still available, prior salary history will no longer serve
as an easily identifiable card for employers to play in the states and cities where the laws have
been enacted.
Businesses will certainly lose one key factor used in the hiring process, making offering
and negotiating a salary more difficult, especially to high-ranking executives.209 Proponents of the
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law, however, recognize that this will lead to more hiring decisions based on merit.210 Businesses
still have education, experience, recommendations, references, aptitude tests, etc. to determine if
a candidate is a proper fit for the job. And, most of these laws do not fully eliminate the ability of
an employer from asking about prior salary history or negotiating once a candidate has voluntarily
disclosed such salary history.211 Eliminating prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” greatly
increases the chances of further closing the wage gap and protecting women from wage
discrimination while leaving businesses no worse off than before.
VI. Resolving the Circuit Split while the Legislatures Act
Even while federal, state, and town legislatures push to enact their own versions of a salary
history inquiry prohibition, those states and towns without such legislation will be bound to the
analysis of the circuit court of the circuit in which they are located. As such, the differing analyses
should be evaluated and resolved. The reasoning of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, that prior
salary history alone cannot be the sole justification as a “factor other than sex,”212 is flawed because
nothing in the EPA or FLSA suggests this standard. The list of exceptions that the EPA added to
the FLSA are separated with an “or” and in the “factor other than sex” language, “factor” is
singular.213 This construction suggests that an employer need only show one of the enumerated
exceptions, and within the catch-all provision, need only show one factor other than sex. By
insisting that employers show prior salary history and an additional factor, the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits are imposing a higher burden on employers facing EPA and FLSA wage-discrimination
challenges.
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Further, the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, that prior salary history is a valid “factor
other than sex” unless there is a showing that the prior salary was the result of gender
discrimination,214 while more reasonable, is too lenient. This approach does not conduct an inquiry
into the current employer’s potential invidious behavior but determining whether or not the prior
employer engaged in gender-based wage discrimination is a daunting task for employees asserting
a violation of the FLSA. The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, affording employers more
discretion than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, affords employers too much discretion.
This leaves the last approach taken by the circuit courts as the best approach when resolving
a plaintiff’s gender-based wage discrimination claim—that taken by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
Those circuits conduct a reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s use of prior salary history as
a factor other than sex or ask whether a reliance on prior salary history effectuates a business
policy.215 This analysis is squarely in the middle of the two approaches mentioned above,
imposing less of a burden than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do, but affording employers less
discretion than the Seventh Circuit does. The approach of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits keeps
both parties’ interests in mind, suspicious of an employer’s reliance on prior salary history, but
willing to accept the idea that an employer innocently uses prior salary history as a legitimate
factor in determining an employee’s pay. So, until prior salary history prohibitions are enacted
throughout the country, district courts and circuit courts should adopt the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in evaluating claims arising under the FLSA involving prior salary history.
VII. Conclusion
Congress enacted the EPA with the intention of eliminating gender-based wage
discrimination. In order to protect employers, however, this Act listed exceptions, one of which
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is a “factor other than sex.” Numerous circuit courts acknowledge that prior salary history is a
“factor other than sex,” varying by how much weight the courts give to that factor alone, despite
the recognition that prior salary history can be exploited and abused to continue gender-based wage
discrimination. Unsatisfied with the current pace of progress regarding equal pay, and unwilling
to let this matter play out in the judiciary, multiple legislatures around the country have enacted
legislations prohibiting inquiries into prior salary history. By their own words, lawmakers
appreciate that the EPA alone is not getting the job done and recognize inquiries into prior salary
history stand as an obstacle to full pay equality for equal work. This march of progress is moving
rapidly and will not stop until prior salary history is eliminated as a “factor other than sex” in its
entirety across the country. As a result, employers will no longer be allowed to disguise genderbased pay discrimination as an innocent reliance on prior salary history.
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